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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON CHINESE OUTWARD INVESTMENT

Empirical research and theory development have traditionally focused on Western
MNEs. The rise of multinational firms from the emerging markets, particularly MNEs from
China has attracted limited empirical research attention. In the current research, I attempt to fill
this gap by exploring the entry modes strategies, motivation and government interference when
Chinese MNEs go abroad. Early international business theories suggested that firms invest
abroad on the basis of possessing certain-firm specific competitive advantages. By leveraging
these existing firm-specific advantages overseas, firms are able to generate sufficient returns to
overcome the “liability of foreignness”. These early FDI theories were largely based on the
experiences of western multinationals. In contrast to this perspective, Chinese MNEs appear to
invest in both developing countries and advanced industrialized nations where they typically lack
of competitive advantages.
My first essay explores the location choice of Chinese outward investment from both
asset-exploitation and asset-exploration perspectives. I find that Chinese MNEs with aggressive
market-seeking motives tend to invest in advanced industrialized nations, while Chinese MNEs
with defensive market-seeking motives tend to invest in developing nations or newly
industrialized nations. The results also show that Chinese MNEs tend to invest in advanced
industrialized nations to acquired advanced technology.
In the second essay I explore diversification mode choices from assetexploitation/exploration and organizational learning perspectives. I find that Chinese MNEs with
aggressive market-seeking motives are more likely to choose Greenfield overseas investments,
iv

while those Chinese firms with defensive market-seeking motives are more likely to choose
acquisitions. The results also show that Chinese MNEs with learning advanced management
skills and acquiring advanced technology tend to enter foreign markets through acquiring
existing overseas firms.
In the last essay I explore the impact of ownership type on the international performance
of Chinese MNEs. China is characterized by three ownership types, SOEs, POEs and COEs.
POEs are owned and operated by the central government. Because Chinese COEs possess both
social network ties with the government while maintaining corporate entrepreneurial
orientations, COEs typically have better international performance than either Chinese POEs or
SOEs.
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THREE ESSAYS ON CHINESE OUTWARD INVESTMENT
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the influence of investment motives,
location choice, diversification modes and ownership types on Chinese outward investment
success. Early international business theories suggested that firms invest abroad on the basis of
possessing certain-firm specific competitive advantages. By leveraging these existing firmspecific advantages overseas, firms are able to generate sufficient returns to overcome the
“liability of foreignness”. These early FDI theories were largely based on the experiences of
western multinationals. In contrast to this perspective, Chinese MNEs appear to invest in (1)
developing countries where they have some type of competitive advantage over domestic firms,
and (2) in advanced industrialized countries where they typically are less competitive in markets.
My first essay explores the location choice of Chinese outward investment from both
asset-exploitation and asset-exploration perspectives. From assets-exploration perspective, I
propose that Chinese MNEs with strategic assets-seeking motivations are more likely to invest
advanced industrialized nations to acquire strategic assets, thereby compensating for a lack of
competitive advantages. From assets-exploitation perspective, I propose that Chinese MNEs
with market-seeking motivations are more likely to exploit their competitive advantages by
investing in developing countries. I found that Chinese MNEs with aggressive market-seeking
motive (seeking new markets) are more likely to invest in advanced industrialized nations, those
Chinese MNEs with defensive market-seeking motives (avoiding saturated home markets and
avoiding trade barriers) are more likely to invest in developing countries and newly
industrialized markets. These results run counter to prior scholarship: the influence of defensive
1

and aggressive market-seeking motives on investment locations is different. Future research
efforts should keep these differences in mind when examining the location decisions of Chinese
MNEs’ investment abroad.
In the second essay I explore diversification mode choices from assetexploitation/exploration and organizational learning perspectives. The literature on the choice
between acquisitions and Greenfield ventures has largely focused on transaction costs or
firm/host country characteristics. Few studies explore diversification mode choice from a
strategic motive perspective. Why a firm invests in a foreign market is considered to be a firm’s
strategic motive; it plays an important role in formulating a firm’s diversification mode strategy.
In this essay I propose that Chinese MNEs entering foreign markets for market-seeking motives
tend to prefer Greenfield investments; Chinese MNEs entering foreign markets for strategic
asset-seeking motives tend to prefer acquisitions. Consistent with the first essay, the influence of
aggressive and defensive market-seeking motives on modes choices is different. Chinese MNEs
with aggressive market-seeking motives are more likely to select Greenfield investments, while
those firms with defensive market seeking motive are more likely to select acquisition. Chinese
MNEs with strategic assets-seeking motive are more likely to choose acquisitions.
In the last essay I explore the impact of ownership type on the international performance
of Chinese MNEs. Privately owned enterprises (POEs) dominate developed economies.
However, ownership patterns are much different in transitional economies than they are in
developed countries. For instance, China is characterized by three ownership types, SOEs, POEs
and COEs. SOEs are owned and operated by the central government. POEs are owned and
operated by individual entrepreneurs. COEs fall between SOEs and POEs. COEs are subordinate
to local governments, but owned and operated by workers or private cooperative organizations.
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In the last essay, I propose that because Chinese COEs possess both social network ties with the
government while maintaining corporate entrepreneurial orientations, COEs typically have better
international performance than either Chinese POEs or SOEs.
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ESSAY#1
THE LOCATION CHOICE OF CHINESE OUTWARD INVESTMENT
ASSET-EXPLOITATION V. ASSET-EXPLORATION

INTRODUCTION
Early international business (IB) theories suggested that firms invest abroad on the basis
of possessing certain firm-specific competitive advantages (Kindleberger, 1969; Hymer, 1976;
Caves, 1971; Vernon, 1966; Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1995). By leveraging these
existing firm-specific advantages overseas, firms are able to generate sufficient returns to
overcome what is called “liability of foreignness” (Buckely and Ghauri, 1999; Zaheer, 1995;
Buckley & Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982; Dunning, 1977, Hennart, 1982), the additional costs and
risks associated with doing business in a foreign marketplace (Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969;
Zaheer, 1995).
Examples of early scholarship include the work of Stephen Hymer (1976) who studied
the international operations of the U.S. firms. Hymer (1976) suggested that foreign investment is
undertaken by firms that possess certain types of monopolistic competitive advantages. It also
includes Raymond Vernon’s (1966) work which used USA investment in Western Europe to
construct the product life cycle theory (PLC). The PLC proposed that Multinationals extend
existing know-how to developing countries in order to produce/sell low priced standardized
products only at the standardization stage of the product cycle. Similarly Buckley and Casson
(1976) examined over four hundred large manufacturing firms, from the United States, United
Kingdom, Japan and Western Europe. Buckley and Casson (1976) concluded that the
international configuration of a MNE depends on its’ firm-specific advantages. Thus, these early
4

FDI theories all (1) appear to be based exclusively upon the experiences of western
multinationals and (2) assume that in order to invest abroad firms need to possess specific
competitive advantages.
Do these theories apply to emerging market firms, more specifically to Chinese MNEs?
At first glance, it appears they may not. Early FDI theories were based on the experience of
western MNEs, and for that reason may not apply to emerging market firms. For instance, in
contrast to the assumption of that firms need to possess specific competitive advantages prior to
investing abroad, Chinese MNEs appear to invest in (1) developing countries where they have
some type of competitive advantage over domestic firms, and perhaps more surprising, (2) in
advanced industrialized countries where they typically lack a basis for sustainable competitive
advantage (Deng, 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007). These observations lead me to propose that,
although traditional FDI theories developed based on western MNEs may explain Chinese
outward investment in developing countries, they do not explain why Chinese firms invest in
advanced industrialized countries.
The theoretical prism used in this paper to examine Chinese outward FDI is based on the
theory of exploitation/exploration first developed by March (1991) but expanded to the notion of
asset exploitation/exploration by Makino, Lau and Yeh (2002). Makino et al. (2002) used the
concepts of asset exploitation/exploration to examine the location choices of Taiwanese FDI.
They hypothesized and found that Taiwanese firms with market-seeking motivations were more
likely to invest in developed countries than in developing countries (except China and India). In
contrast to their findings, I propose that Chinese MNEs with market-seeking motivations are
more likely to invest in developing countries than in advanced industrialized countries.

5

From an asset exploitation perspective, FDI is viewed as a means to transfer proprietary
assets across borders (Makino et al., 2002; Yiu, Lau and Bruton, 2007). Market-seeking FDI is
considered to be one type of asset-exploiting investment (Narula & Dunning, 2000); firms with
market-seeking motivations invest in host countries to exploit existing firm-specific advantages
(Makino, et al., 2002). For reasons discussed later in this paper, Chinese MNEs lack the ability to
exploit their advantages in advanced industrialized countries (Makino et al., 2002; Buckeley et
al., 2007; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Thus, I propose that Chinese MNEs with market-seeking
motivations are more likely to exploit their competitive advantages by investing in developing
countries than by investing in advanced industrialized countries; this prediction differs from the
Makino, et al. (2002) hypotheses.
From an asset exploration perspective, FDI is viewed as a means to acquire strategic
assets (i.e. technology, marketing and management expertise) available in a host country
(Makino et al., 2002; Luo and Tung, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007). Thus, an asset-exploration
perspective contrasts with early FDI theories (Hymer, 1976; Vernon, 1966; Buckley and Casson,
1976). Firms lacking firm-specific advantages may still invest abroad in order to obtain strategic
assets that remedy current firm competitive disadvantages (Child and Rodrigues, 2005).
Strategic asset-seeking investment is a type of asset-exploring or asset-augmenting investment
(Narula & Dunning, 2000); firms with strategic asset-seeking motivations invest in host
countries to acquire strategic assets, thereby compensating for a lack of competitive advantage
(Luo and Tung, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007). Since strategic assets tend to be concentrated in
developed countries (Makino et al, 2002), I propose that Chinese MNEs with strategic assetseeking motivations attempt to obtain strategic assets such as advanced technology, marketing
and management expertise by investing in advanced industrialized countries.
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Thus, this research project attempts to make two contributions to the FDI literature: (1) it
predicts Chinese outward FDI in advanced industrialized nations, which can not be explained
using the conventional FDI theories and (2) shows that Chinese MNEs are unlike NIC’s MNEs
(newly industrialzied country-Taiwan) which Makino et al (2002) show follows the traditional
pattern of market-seeking FDI into advanced industrialized countries.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Developing Countries MNEs’ Foreign Investment
Past literature has tended to focus almost exclusively on how MNEs from developed
countries go international. In contrast, relatively little research has examined the motivations of
developing country MNEs investing in other developing countries. The few studies that do exist
tend to focus on how firms from developing countries invest in other developing countries or
“downstream countries” primarily when production costs in their home country made their
products non-competitive, e.g. for cost reduction motives (e.g., Wells, 1977, 1983; Kumar and
McLeod, 1981; Lall, 1983).
Second, the possibility that developing country firms invest internationally in order to
seek strategic assets or technology has not attracted much attention in the literature (Wesson,
1999). One of exceptions is Makino, Lau and Yeh (2002) who found that Taiwanese firms’
outward investment motivation had a significant influence on location choice. Firms were found
to more likely invest in developed countries to seek strategic assets or while firms are more
likely invest in developing countries for low cost labor-seeking purposes. Similarly, LeCraw
(1993) found that Indonesian multinationals go abroad not only to exploit their existing
ownership advantages but also to access and develop new competitive strength. Tsang and Yip
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(2007) examined the FDI’s hazard rates of Singapore firms and suggested that MNEs are likely
to invest countries that are more developed than their own home countries for the opportunity of
resource exploration. These studies provide initial evidence that developing country firms may
invest in advanced industrialized countries for assets exploration.
The international expansion strategies of Chinese MNEs differ from the early
internationalization activities of multinationals from the newly industrialized economies (e.g.
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore), their outward investment driven primarily by
“push factors” such as appreciating currencies, rising labor shortages or small and saturated
domestic markets (Luo and Tung, 2007; Lecaw, 1993). Chinese outward investments are more
aggressive and primarily driven by the “pull factors” to secure critical resources, advanced
technology or managerial expertise (Luo and Tung, 2007). Chinese multinationals systematically
use international expansion as a springboard to acquire critical resources to compete their global
rivals in both home and world markets (Luo and Tung, 2007). Many Chinese multinationals have
reorganized their home production base and /or rebranded their homemade products after
learning foreign acquiree’s technologies and brands. Thus, Chinese MNEs still heavily relied on
their home base as the primary manufacturing center.
Investment Motivations of Chinese MNEs
Based on prior international business literature (Dunning, 1993, 1995, 1998; Brouthers,
Gao and McNicol, 2008), three general motivations (objectives) for MNEs to invest abroad exist:
market-seeking, strategic asset-seeking and resource-seeking. Market-seeking FDI involves
investing in a host country market in order to directly serve that market with local production and
distribution (Dunning, 1998; Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). Dunning (1993) suggested that firms
seek market expansion for a variety of reasons: expanding existing buyer-supplier relationships
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in host countries; producing products close to local markets in order to reduce transportation
costs; and avoiding tariff and non-tariff barriers. Resource-seeking FDI involves investing in a
host country market in order to achieve cost-minimization motives by obtaining resources either
too costly to obtain or unavailable in the home market (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). Finally, the
purpose of strategic asset-seeking investment is to obtain key strategic assets, such as
technology, branding and/or organizational capabilities; their purpose is to enhance long-run
competitive advantage for the firm (Makino et al., 2002).
A Chinese company may have multiple objectives for a given investment project. For
instance, Lenovo acquired IBM’s PC unit not only to obtain strategic assets, but also helped
Lenovo to get into the US markets (Deng, 2009). Alternatively, motivations for FDI might also
change as an enterprise becomes a more experienced investor (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng,
2004). Initially, some Chinese firms may have invested abroad to acquire natural resources or to
gain access to markets. However, with increased international operational experience, they may
use investment activities as a means to improve their global market position by acquiring new
sources of competitive advantage (Deng, 2004).
We exclude resource-seeking investment (labor-seeking FDI and raw materials seeking
FDI) from the current study for two reasons. First, because China is considered to be a global
production center with cheap labor resources, labor-seeking FDI is not a major motive for
Chinese firms (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Second, raw materials availability and low country
risk are the primary determinants of raw-materials seeking FDI (Brouthers, O’Donnell, and
Hadjimarcou, 2007); hence there is considerably less managerial choice involved in these
decisions. Thus resource-seeking FDI is not included in the current study.

9

Asset-Exploitation vs. Asset-Exploration
From an organizational learning perspective, March (1991) suggests that exploration
focuses on gaining new information to improve future returns while exploitation uses existing
information to improve present returns. Compared to exploitation, exploration is more risky, but
involves gaining new information and offers greater potential gains over the long-run (March,
1991).
FDI theories have emphasized firm-specific advantages or ownership advantages derived
from the ownership of intangible assets such as technology, management skills, and
organizational capabilities (Caves, 1971). When exploiting existing firm-specific advantages in
foreign countries, firms need to generate enough returns to offset the additional costs/risks
associated with doing business in a host country (Hymer, 1976). The advantages here are not the
absolute level of ownership advantages, but the strength of the firms over other countries’ firms
(Dunning, 1993).
In contrast, from an exploration perspective, firms invest in foreign countries to acquire
new competitive advantages. Exploring foreign markets allows firms to acquire strategic assets
(such as advanced technology, brand equity, marketing expertise etc.) unavailable in the home
nation market. One of the key strategic assets many companies, especially developing
multinationals lacking is brand equity. One foreign acquisition can help developing MNEs’
brand awareness and reputation in the world market. For instance, TCL, a leading Chinese color
TV and cell phone maker, began to aggressively promote their brand in the world market in
2000. Although TCL is a consumer electronics leader in China, the brand “ TCL” is only limited
to Southeast Asia. In 2003, TCL merged with Thomson’s TV and DVD operations, obtaining
Thomson brand in European market and RCA brand in the U.S.

10

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Market-seeking FDI
Market-seeking FDI is primarily considered as one type of asset-exploiting investment
(Narula & Dunning, 2000); the investing company’s primary purpose is to generate economic
rents through the use of existing firm-specific advantages. Therefore, I suggest that Chinese
MNEs with market-seeking motives tend to invest in foreign countries where they have a
competitive advantage over local firms (and perhaps over some other foreign competitors as
well).
Chinese MNEs have developed specific advantages that allow them to compete in the
world markets (Buckley et al., 2007). These advantages include low-cost production (Child and
Rodrigues, 2005) and prior familiarity with operating in emerging markets (Buckley et al.,
2007). Chinese MNEs gain the capabilities to cope with home country conditions (such as
uncertain economic development, lack of well established regulatory environment, and weak
market-enhancing institutions). These capabilities can be leveraged in the similar foreign markets
and become competitive advantages of Chinese MNEs. In advanced industrialized countries,
Chinese MNEs lack the ability to exploit cheap labor (Makino et al., 2002) and as relative
newcomers to world markets, the typical Chinese MNE has less experience operating in
advanced industrialized countries than in developing countries (Buckley et al., 2007). Finally,
extant theory suggests that early international investments of firms tend to occur in countries
with cultural/economic development levels similar to the home country (Johanson and Vahlne,
1977; Tsang and Yip, 2007). For these reasons, we hypothesize that Chinese MNEs with marketseeking motives is more likely to occur in developing countries that in advanced industrialized
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nations where existing advantages (cheap labor costs and familiarity with the developing
country) can be exploited:
Hypothesis 1: Chinese MNEs with market-seeking motivations are more likely to invest in
developing countries than advanced industrialized countries.
Strategic asset-seeking Investment
Strategic asset-seeking investment is one type of asset-exploring or asset-augmenting
investment (Narula & Dunning, 2000; Luo and Tung, 2007; Tsang and Yip, 2007); the investing
firm’s primary purpose is to gain access to technology, skill-related intangible resources and/or
complementary assets through FDI (Dunning, 1998; Makino et al., 2002). It is logical for
Chinese MNEs with strategic asset-seeking motives to invest in countries abundant in advanced
strategic assets.
Since strategic assets tend to be concentrated in advanced industrialized countries
(Makino et al, 2002; Tsang and Yip, 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007), Chinese MNEs with strategic
asset-seeking motivations are more likely to invest in advanced industrialized countries in order
to acquire established brand names, novel product technology, and/or extensive distributor
networks; each of these strategies tend to enhance Chinese firms’ non-price competitiveness
(Makino et al., 2002; Deng, 2007). Based on this logic we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Chinese MNEs with strategic asset-seeking motivations are more likely to
invest in advanced industrialized countries than developing countries.

12

METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data Source
In 2006, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and the China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade jointly conducted a survey, exploring outward investment by Chinese
companies under Chinese government’s “going global” strategy. The data used in the current
research comes from this study, the China Goes Global (2006) data set. The survey collected 164
valid responses used in this analysis.
Dependent Variable
Location
Dependent variable is measured as the probability of a certain location is chosen.
Advanced industrialized countries (AICs), newly industrialized countries (NICs), and developing
countries (DCs) are used to identify the possibilities of location of Chinese overseas investment.
Countries like Australia, Canada, Germany, and the U.S. were classified as advanced
industrialized economies; South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao were classified as
newly industrialized economies; while Vietnam and Thailand were classified as developing
countries. The variable, AICs was calculated as the number of AIC locations divided by total
overseas investment locations. For instance, a company has chosen Austria, Canada and Hong
Kong as the targeted locations. In this case, the probability of investing AICs is 66.67 percent.
NICs and DCs were measured in the same way.
Independent variables – Investment motives
I adopted my typology of internationalization motivation based on Dunning’s (1981,
1994, 1998) three types of FDI: resource-seeking, market-seeking and strategic-seeking

13

investment. The current study will restrict its examination to market-seeking and strategicseeking FDI motivation.
Market-seeking motives
Market-seeking investments aim at either penetrating new markets or maintaining
existing ones (Dunning, 1993; Dunning, 1998). Market-seeking FDI can be aggressive, serving
new foreign clients by locating in markets with a growing market potential (Sanchez-Peinado,
Pla-Barber and Hebert, 2007); Market-seeking FDI may also be employed as a defensive
strategy. When the domestic markets have reached the limits of effective demand, firms are often
forced to seek markets abroad (Dunning, 1993; Phatak, Bhagat and Kashlak, 2005). When facing
a variety of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in host countries, firms often have to substitute
local production for export, in order to maintain the continued access to the existing markets
(Dunning, 1998; Moon and Roehl, 2001). Based on the above statements, market-seeking
motives consist of three dimensions: seeking new markets (M1), avoiding saturated home
markets (M2) and avoiding trade barriers (M3). In the current research, managers were asked to
rate the importance of these three dimensions on seven-point scales.
Strategic asset-seeking motives
Strategic asset-seeking investments aim at obtaining key strategic assets, such as
technology, branding and or other organizational capabilities (Dunning, 1998; Deng, 2007;
Makino et al., 2002). In the current research, strategic asset-seeking motives consist of three
dimensions: acquiring advanced technology (S1), obtaining internationally recognized brands
(S2), and learning advanced management skills (S3). Again, managers were asked to rate the
importance of three dimensions on seven-point scales.

14

Control variables
Three control variables were included in this study: international experience, firm size
and industry classification. Following Brouthers et al. (1999) and Henisz and Macher (2004), I
defined international experience as the number of years experience investing outside the home
country. International experience variable is logged, because an additional year has greater
impact on the lower levels of international experience than on higher levels of experience (Epple,
Argote and Devadas, 1991; Henisz and Macher, 2004). Firm size was measured on a six-point
ordinal scale, based on the level of total overseas investment by firms (0 = none, 1 = under US$
1 million, 2 = US$ 1- 4 million, 3 = US$ 5-9 million, 4 = US$ 10-100 million and 5 = above
US$ 100 million). To control for possible industry effects, we asked respondents to identify
whether they were in manufacturing or in services. As in Kogut and Singh (1988), the current
research included a dichotomous industry sector variable which was given a value of 1 for
manufacturing firms and a value of 0 for service firms.

RESULTS
Table 1-1 presents a correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for all variables used in
the study. Table 1-2 shows three sets of hierarchical OLS models used to test hypotheses.
Models 1a, 2a and 3a include only control variables. Model 1b, 2b and 3b add the independent
variables.
-------------------------------Insert Table 1-1 here
-------------------------------Model 1b shows that seeking new markets has a statistically significant, positive
coefficient (β = 0.048, p < 0.05, one-tailed test) i.e. seeking new markets was positively
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associated with the probabilities of choosing AICs than other alternatives. This is contradictory
to hypothesis 1, but consistent with Makino et al., (2002).
-------------------------------Insert Table 1-2 here
-------------------------------Model 1b also shows that acquiring advanced technology has a statistically significant positive
coefficient (β = 0.045, p < 0.05, one-tailed test) i.e. acquiring advanced technology was
positively associated with the probabilities of choosing AICs than other alternatives. This
supports hypothesis 2; Chinese MNEs with strategic asset-seeking motivations are more likely to
invest in advanced industrialized countries.
Model 2b shows that avoiding saturated home markets has a statistically significant
positive coefficient (β = 0.021, p < 0.10, one-tailed test) i.e. avoiding saturated home markets
was positively associated with the probabilities of choosing DCs other than alternatives. This
supports hypothesis 1: Chinese MNEs with market-seeking motivations are more likely to invest
in developing countries.
Model 2b shows that avoiding trade barriers has a statistically significant negative
coefficient (β = -0.051, p < 0.01, one-tailed test) i.e. avoiding trade barriers was negatively
associated with probabilities of choosing DCs other than alternatives. This is contradictory to
hypothesis 1.
Unlike Makino et al. (2002), the current research separated newly industrialized markets
from advanced industrialized markets and found that avoiding trade barriers was positively
associated with probabilities of choosing NIC other than alternatives (Model 3b: β = -0.029, p <
0.10, one-tailed test).
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Additional logistic regression analyses
In order to test the robustness of the results, I also conducted logistic regression analyses.
Variables, measurements and results are produced below:
Location
Three dependent variables, advanced industrialized countries (AICs), newly
industrialized countries (NICs), and developing countries (DCs) are used to identify the location
of Chinese overseas investment. Australia, Canada, Germany, and the U.S. were classified as
advanced industrialized economies; South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao were
classified as newly industrialized economies; while Vietnam and Thailand were classified as
developing countries. The variable, AICs was defined as a dummy categorical variable, coded
“1” when a firm has at least one advanced industrialized country as the intended investment
location and “0” when a firm does not intend to invest in any advanced industrialized countries.
Similarly, NICs was defined as a dummy categorical variable, coded “1” when a firm has at least
one newly industrialized country as the intended investment location and “0” when a firm does
not intend to invest in any newly industrialized countries. DCs was defined as a dummy
categorical variable, coded “1” when a firm has at least one developing country as the intended
investment location and “0” when a firm does not intend to invest in any developing countries.
Results of logistic analyses
Model 1b shows that seeking new markets has a statistically significant, positive
coefficient when comparing firms with at least one AIC investment to firms with no AIC
investments (β = 0.29, p < 0.05, one-tailed test). Model 1b also shows that avoiding saturated
home markets has a statistically significant, positive coefficient when comparing firms with at
least one AIC investment to firms with no AIC investments (β = 0.24, p < 0.05, one-tailed test).
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Model 1b also shows that acquiring advanced technology has a statistically significant positive
coefficient when comparing firms with at least one AIC investment to firms with no AIC
investments (β = 0.22, p < 0.05, one-tailed test).

-------------------------------Insert Table 1-3 here
-------------------------------Model 2b shows that seeking new markets has a statistically significant, negative
coefficient when comparing firms with at least one NIC and firms with none of NICs (β = -0.24,
p < 0.05, one-tailed test). Model 2b also shows that avoiding trade barriers has a statistically
significant, positive coefficient when comparing with firms with at least one NICs and firms with
none of NICs (β = 0.23, p < 0.05, one-tailed test).
Model 3b shows that avoiding saturated home markets has a statistically significant,
positive coefficient when comparing firms with at least one DC and firms with none of DCs (β =
0.23, p < 0.05, one-tailed test).
Both OLS and logistic analyses produce similar results. Chinese MNEs with a seekingnew-markets motive are more likely to invest in advanced industrialized markets; firms with an
avoiding-saturated-home- markets motive are more likely to invest in developing markets; firms
with an avoiding-trade-barriers motive are more likely to invest in newly industrialized markets.
Chinese MNEs with acquiring-advanced-technology motives are more likely to invest in
advanced industrialized markets.
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CONCLUSION
The primary contribution of this research comes from examining the impact of
investment motives on the location choices of Chinese outward FDI. This contribution is derived
from two sets of theoretical arguments and related empirical findings. First, from assetsexploration view, I propose that Chinese MNEs with strategic assets-seeking motivations are
more likely to explore their competitive advantages by investing in advanced industrialized
nations. The results suggest that Chinese MNEs tend to invest in advanced industrialized nations
to acquired advanced technology.
Second, from assets-exploitation view, I propose that Chinese MNEs with marketseeking motivations are more likely to exploit their competitive advantages by investing in
developing countries than investing in advanced industrialized countries; this prediction differs
from the Makino, et al. (2002) hypotheses. The results suggest that firms with aggressive marketseeking motives (seeking new markets) tend to invest in advanced industrialized nations,
consistent with the conventional wisdom, while Chinese MNEs with defensive market-seeking
motives (avoiding saturated home markets, avoiding trade barriers) tend to invest in developing
nations or newly industrialized nations. This finding, though inconsistent with the conventional
wisdom, is interesting. It should be noted that the influence of market-seeking motives on
investment locations is different; future research efforts may benefit from keeping these
differences in mind when examining the location decisions of MNEs’ investment abroad.
Limitation and Future Research
The current study has a few limitations. First, multinational firms often proceed by
gradualism in market entry (Buckley, Cross, Tan, Xin, and Voss, 2008). Particularly, emerging
market firms often first enter markets that are culturally, physically, and economically similar to
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their home countries (Buckley et al., 2008; Tsang and Yip, 2007). Then as firms’ international
experience grow and become more competitive in markets, firms start to enter more psychic
distant countries. However, it seems that Chinese ODI does not conform to this general model.
Early Chinese ODI was directed mostly to developed countries rather than developing countries
that have similar economic development levels (Buckley et al., 2008). In order to test this theory,
time series data are required. Subject to data availability, future studies should explore the
location sequence of Chinese ODI using time series data.
Second, the current research used the results of a survey designed and conducted by the
third party (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade). For this reason some of the items were not the ideal way to measure a
variable. For instance, a company selected multiple investment locations, instead just one single
country, which makes the study harder to explore the location decision at each transaction level.
Third, the use of a single item to measure investment motivations may create internal
validity and reliability problems. However, collecting survey data in developing countries like
China commonly represents a great challenge. Many managers in China often decline to
participate in survey research because they tend to be suspicious about its motives and intended
purpose (Brouthers et al., 2005). Chinese managers often refuse to expose firms’ business
information to a third party, because divulging business information is considered to be a
dangerous practice (Brouthers, et al., 2005). Thus, researchers often make questionnaires shorter
to facilitate survey completion (Brouthers and Xu, 2002). Such shorter questionnaires can result
in variables being measure by a single item. Thus it is not unusual for surveys in developing
countries like China to include single-item measures.
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Fourth, this research requires asking about strategic motivations and location choice of
foreign investments. Not all managers are familiar with these types of firm decisions. Thus, in
survey research, some managers might not provide accurate responses.
Lastly, firms with aggressive market-seeking motives tend to select advanced
industrialized nations rather than developing markets. This result contradicts my theory that
firms with market-seeking motives more likely to enter developing nations where firms have
competitive edge over local firms. However, this finding suggests that future research should
consider defensive market-seeking investment and aggressive market-seeking investment
differently.

\
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ESSAY #2
THE DIVERSIFICATION MODE CHOICE OF CHINESE OUT
INVESTMENT: ACQUSITION VS. GREENFIELD STARTUP

INTRODUCTION
Once a firm has decided to invest in a foreign market, it needs to make one or two more
decisions (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). One decision is that a firm has to choose the level of
equity investment, wholly-owned subsidiaries versus joint ventures (Brouthers and Brouthers,
2000; Ruiz-Moreno, Mas-Ruiz and Nicolau-Gonzálbez, 2007). If a firm decides on a whollyowned subsidiary it also must decide whether to create a new venture from scratch (i.e.,
Greenfield venture) or acquire an existing venture (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Ruiz-Moreno
et al., 2007; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Hennart and Park, 1993). The later decision
(Greenfield investment vs. acquisition) has been referred to as diversification mode choice
(Ruiz-Moreno et al., 2007; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Various scholars have mentioned
that diversification mode choice is under-researched (Chang; 1995; Melin, 1992; Barkema and
Vermeulen, 1998). As Hennart and Park (1993: 1055) state, “there is no well-developed theory
of the determinants of the choice between Greenfield investment and acquisitions”.
Previous studies that investigate factors that might influence the choice between
acquisitions and Greenfield ventures use either transaction cost theory or Dunning’s OLI
(Ownership-Location-Internalization) eclectic model as their theoretical prisms. For instance,
Brouthers and Brouthers state, “[g]reenfield ventures offer lower transaction costs” (2000:91),
since the firm can avoid the additional costs of “[r]etraining the work force and injecting the
resident management with a new philosophy” (Dunning, 1993:432). Moreover, in order to
reduce the chances of knowledge dissemination, firms with greater firm-specific advantages
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prefer to choose a Greenfield mode (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Diversification mode
choice is also driven by the relative technological advantages of home and host countries (Anand
and Delios, 2002). The higher relative technology advantages of the host country, the more likely
an acquisition mode is chosen (Anand and Delios, 2002). Thus, the literature on the choice
between acquisitions and Greenfield ventures has largely focused on transaction costs and
firm/host country characteristics.
However, few studies explore diversification mode choice from a strategic motive
perspective (e.g. Harzing, 2002). Why a firm invests in a foreign market is considered to be the
firm’s strategic motive; it plays an important role in formulating a firm’s entry mode strategy
(Randøy and Clay, 2006; Anand and Delios, 2002; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). The present
study explores how firms’ strategic motives influence their diversification mode decisions,
whether to expand abroad through Greenfield ventures or acquisitions using an organizational
learning perspective.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on diversification mode choice has been largely based on transaction cost
economics or Dunning’s OLI framework. The underlying assumption of these theories is that
firms possess certain competitive advantages and by leveraging their advantages overseas, firms
can generate enough returns to overcome the additional costs/risks associated with doing
business abroad. When a firm has a strong competitive advantage, a Greenfield diversification
mode is often chosen (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001) for three reasons. First, unlike acquisitions,
Greenfield investments minimize costs in transferring firm-specific advantages to a foreign
company (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). Second, Greenfield investments can reduce the
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chances of dissemination of firm-specific advantages (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Lastly, it
is very difficult or impossible to infuse a firm’s technology, management skills or corporate
culture in the acquired company because of organizational inertia (Barkeman and Vermeulen,
1998). Thus, Greenfield ventures may be the most efficient mode of entry when firms invest in
foreign countries to exploit existing firm-specific advantages.
However, unlike western multinationals, Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss & Zheng
(2007) suggest that Chinese MNEs may invest in developed countries to obtain advanced
strategic assets (advanced technology, brand equity assets, and management skills) rather than to
exploit existing advantages, compensating for a lack of internal firm-specific advantages. As
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) state, “[t]he acquisition allows the firm to acquire the new
technological resources…which substitute for the internal development of technological skills”
(1998:9). Through acquisition, the acquiring Chinese firm can rapidly access advanced strategic
assets because such assets tend to be found primarily in western economies (Belderbos, 2003).
Moreover, it takes much longer to develop technology and build a subsidiary from scratch than
to acquire an existing company (Hennart and Reddy, 1997). The acquired affiliate often has an
existing knowledge or technology base that allows the acquiring company to forego the timeconsuming process of incrementally building up its knowledge base and organizational
capabilities (Belderbos, 2003).
In addition, it is very difficult to access/develop advanced strategic assets through
internal development (Anand and Delios, 2002); the rigidity of organizational routines
constraints a firm in developing new capabilities in business activities that vary substantially
from existing activities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 1987). When internal development is
difficult, a firm often obtains advanced knowledge by acquiring an existing company possessing
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the required capabilities/factors (Anand and Delios, 2002). Thus, firms can efficiently and
quickly obtain required strategic assets by acquiring an existing company.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Market-seeking Motives
Market-seeking FDI is primarily considered as one type of asset-exploiting investment
(Narula & Dunning, 2000); the investing firm’s primary purpose is to generate economic rents
through the exploitation of existing firm-specific advantages. Therefore, we suggest that Chinese
MNEs with market-seeking motives tend to invest in countries where they have a competitive
advantage over local firms (and perhaps over some other foreign competitors as well).
Companies often use Greenfield investments to exploit firm-specific advantages that are
difficult to separate from their organization (Hennart and Park, 1993); it may be easier to set up a
new venture rather than attempting to transfer existing capabilities into acquired companies.
Moreover, firms with strong capabilities typically prefer Greenfield ventures in order to reduce
the risk of dissemination of firm-specific advantages (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000).
Thus, we conclude that Chinese MNEs with market-seeking motives invest in developing
countries to exploit firm-specific advantages; setting up a new venture is considered as an
efficient way of exploiting superior strategic assets in foreign markets (Chang and Rosenzweig,
2001; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Barkeman and Vermeulen, 1998). Based on the above
discussion we hypothesize:
H3: Chinese MNEs entering foreign markets with market-seeking motives prefer
Greenfield investments.
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Strategic Asset-seeking Motives
Strategic asset-seeking investment is one type of asset-exploring or asset-augmenting
investment (Narula & Dunning, 2000); the investing firm’s primary purpose is to gain access to
technology, skill-related intangible resources and/or complementary assets through FDI (Makino
et al., 2002). Since superior strategic assets tend to be concentrated in developed countries
(Makino et al, 2002), it is logical for Chinese MNEs with strategic asset-seeking motives to
invest in developed countries to acquire advanced strategic assets.
Because these strategic assets tend to be concentrated in developed countries (Makino et
al, 2002), Chinese MNEs need to enter such locations in order to obtain these assets. Moreover,
many country-specific advantages are likely to be embodied in “high-technology firms” (Shan
and Hamilton, 1991). Since Chinese MNEs do not possess these advantages, they have to obtain
location-specific and/or firm-embodied technologies through either Greenfield investments or
acquisitions.
However, setting up a competitive overseas subsidiary in a technologically advanced
country requires a long incubation period and a large amount of investment before the new
venture begins to work effectively (Hennart and Reddy, 1997). Moreover, Anand and Delios
(2002) suggest that it is very difficult to internally develop required capabilities through
Greenfield investments. Unlike Greenfield ventures, access to technological resources
embedded in foreign firms can be obtained through acquisitions (Belderbos, 2003; Anand and
Delios, 2002).
Perhaps for these reasons, acquisition of overseas firms has become the preferred mode
for Chinese MNE investment in the EU/USA for Chinese firms interested in acquiring strategic
resources (Deng, 2007; Buckley et al., 2007). A Chinese MNE with a strategic asset-seeking
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motive tends to invest in developed countries to acquire knowledge and learn new skills and
capabilities, enhancing their competitive advantages (Buckley et al., 2007). FDI in the form of
acquisition is considered to be a rapid and reliable method of obtaining superior strategic assets
found in developed countries (Anand and Delios, 2002; Belderbos, 2003). Thus, we hypothesize:
H4: Chinese MNEs entering markets with strategic asset-seeking motives prefer
acquisitions.

Strategic Fit and Performance
Strategic contingency theorists maintain that an appropriate fit between the firm’s strategy
and its context results in superior performance (Venkatraman, 1989); this is commonly referred
to as “strategic fit”. In this paper, the firm’s strategy refers to diversification mode choice
(Greenfield investment versus. Acquisition) and the context in which the firm operates is
conceptualized as the investment motives (Market-seeking versus Strategic asset-seeking). Based
on the concept of strategic fit, firms enhance their international performance by achieving fit
between their entry modes choice and investment motives.
In this paper I hypothesized that Chinese MNEs entering foreign markets with marketseeking motives prefer Greenfield investment while firms entering markets with strategic assetseeking motives prefer acquisitions. Here I hypothesize that these relationships are not just
predictive, they are normative as well. Based on the concept of strategic fit I hypothesize that
Chinese firms that pursue the hypothesized diversification mode strategy will typically
outperform Chinese firms not pursuing the hypothesized diversification mode strategy:
H5: Chinese firms that pursue the suggested diversification mode strategies (H3 and H4)
will, on average, have better performance than Chinese firms pursuing other strategies.
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METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data Source
In 2006, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and the China Council for Promotion of
International Trade jointly conducted a survey, exploring the overseas investment intentions of
Chinese companies. The data used in the current research comes from this study, the China Goes
Global (2006) data set. The survey collected 164 valid responses used in this analysis.
Dependent variable
Entry mode
The variable, diversification mode choice was measured with a dummy variable. It was
coded “1” when the firm chose a Greenfield investment or “0’ when the firm acquired an
existing company.
Independent variables – Investment motives
I adopted my typology of internationalization motivation based on Dunning’s (1981,
1994, 1998) three types of FDI: resource-seeking, market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking
investment. The current study will restrict itself to examining only market-seeking and strategic
asset-seeking FDI motivations.
Market-seeking motives
Market-seeking investments aim at either penetrating new markets or maintaining
existing ones (Dunning, 1993; Dunning, 1998). Market-seeking FDI can be aggressive, serving
new market clients by locating in countries with a growing market potential (Sanchez-Peinado,
Pla-Barber and Hebert, 2007); Market-seeking FDI may also be employed as a defensive
strategy. When the domestic markets have reached the limits of effective demand, firms are often
forced to seek markets abroad (Dunning, 1993; Phatak, Bhagat and Kashlak, 2005). When facing
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a variety of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in host countries, firms often have to substitute
local production for export, in order to maintain the continued access to the existing markets
(Dunning, 1998; Moon and Roehl, 2001). Based on the above statements, three different
motivations appear to underlie market-seeking investment: seeking- new- markets (M1),
avoiding- saturated- home- markets (M2) and avoiding- trade- barriers (M3). In the current
research, managers were asked to rate the importance of each of these three motives on sevenpoint scales.
Strategic asset-seeking motives
Strategic asset-seeking investments aim at obtaining key strategic assets, such as
technology, branding and/or other organizational capabilities (Dunning, 1998; Deng, 2007;
Makino et al., 2002). In the current research, three different motivations appear to underlie
strategic asset-seeking investment: acquiring- advanced- technology (S1), obtaininginternationally- recognized- brands (S2), and learning- advanced- managerial- skills (S3).
Again, managers were asked to rate the importance of each of these three motives on seven-point
scales.
Control variables
Three control variables were included in this study: international experience, firm size
and industry classification. MNEs with extensive international experience are more likely to
enter foreign markets through a Greenfield investment, rather than through an acquisition
(Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Slangen and Hennart, 2008). Following Brouthers et al. (1999)
and Henisz & Macher (2004), I defined international experience as being the number of years
experience a firm has investing outside the home country. Firm size was measured on a fivepoint ordinal scale, based on the level of annual gross revenue in 2005 (1=under RMB 1 million,

29

2=RMB 1-9 million, 3=RMB 10-49 million, 4=50-100 million and 5= Over RMB 100 million).
In addition, I also controlled for the possible influence of industry effects on firms’ entry modes
choices (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Slangen and Hennart, 2008). We coded 1 for manufacturing
firms and 0 for services firms.

RESULTS
Table 1-1 presents a correlation matrix and descriptive statics for all variables used in the
study.
-------------------------------Insert Table 1-1 here
--------------------------------

Table 2-2 shows the results of the binary logistic regression analyses we used to test the
modes choices. I also include odds ratios in Table 2-2 to indicate effect sizes. Model 1a only
includes three control variables, international experience, firm size and manufacturing. Model 1b
adds the independent variables to Model 1a.
-------------------------------Insert Table 2-2 here
--------------------------------

Model 1b shows that the overall model is statistically significant (chi-square=39.37, p<
0.01). The independent variable, seeking- new -markets (M1) has a significantly positive impact
on the likelihood of Greenfield entry (p<0.05, one-tailed); this result shows that Chinese MNEs
entering foreign markets with seeking- new- markets motives tend to choose Greenfield
investments rather than acquisitions, supporting H3.
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Avoiding- saturated- home- markets (M2) has a significantly negative impact on the
likelihood of Greenfield entry (p<0.05, one-tailed); this result shows that Chinese MNEs entering
foreign markets with avoiding-saturated-home-markets motives tend to choose acquisition rather
than Greenfield investments, not supporting H3. Avoiding- trade- barriers (M3) has a
marginally negative impact on the likelihood of Greenfield entry (p<0.10, one-tailed); this result
shows that Chinese MNEs entering foreign markets with avoiding-trade-barriers motives tend to
choose acquisition rather than greenfield investments, not supporting H3.
The variable, acquiring- advanced- technology (S1) has a marginally negative impact on
the likelihood of Greenfield venture (p<0.10, one-tailed); this result shows that Chinese MNEs
entering foreign markets with acquiring-advanced-technology motives tend to choose
acquisitions rather than greenfield investments, supporting H4.
Learning- advanced- management- skills, has a significantly negative impact on the
likelihood of Greenfield venture (p<0.01, one-tailed); this result shows that Chinese MNEs
entering foreign markets with learning-advanced-management-skills motives tend to choose
acquisitions rather Greenfield investments, supporting H4.
Obtaining- internationally- recognized- brands (S2) has a significantly positive impact
on the likelihood of Greenfield venture (p<0.01, one-tailed); this result shows that Chinese
MNEs entering foreign markets with obtaining-internationally-recognized-brands motives tend
to choose Greenfield rather than acquisitions, not supporting H4.
Thus, the above finding suggested that Chinese MNEs with aggressive market seeking
motives are more likely to select Greenfield investments, while Chinese MNEs with defensive
market seeking motive are more likely to select acquisition. Chinese MNEs with strategic assets-

31

seeking motive (learning advanced management skills and obtaining international recognized
brands) are more likely to choose acquisitions.

CONCLUSION
Contributions
The primary contribution of this research comes from examining the impact of
investment motives on the entry mode choices of Chinese outward FDI. This contribution is
derived from three sets of theoretical arguments and related empirical findings. First, from an
asset-exploration view, I propose that Chinese MNEs with strategic asset-seeking motives are
more likely to choose acquisitions rather than Greenfield investment. The results suggest that
Chinese MNEs want to learn advanced management skills and acquire advanced technology
through acquiring existing overseas firms.
Second, from an asset-exploitation view, I propose that Chinese MNEs with marketseeking motives are more likely to choose Greenfield investments. The results suggest that
Chinese MNEs with aggressive market-seeking motives are more likely to choose Greenfield
overseas investments, while those Chinese firms with defensive market-seeking motives are
more likely to choose acquisitions.
Last, previous work on the internationalization of MNEs has ignored the differences
between defensive market-seeking investment and aggressive market-seeking investment. The
current research explored the impact of various market-seeking motives and strategic assetseeking motives. We found that firms with defensive market-seeking motives and aggressive
market-seeking motives tend to choose different entry modes. Future research efforts may
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benefit from keeping these differences in mind when examining the entry modes decisions of not
only Chinese MNEs, but perhaps Western MNEs as well.
Limitations and Future Research
The current study has a few limitations. First, MNEs select appropriate overseas
strategies in order to gain competitive strength in the world market and further to improve firm
performance. Due to data availability, the current research is unable to link entry modes decision
to international performance of each subsidiary (H5-untested). Future research might develop a
normative model to explore whether firms that pursue the suggested strategies will have better
international performance than firms pursuing other strategies.
Second, the use of a single item to measure investment motivations may create internal
validity and reliability problems. However, collecting survey data in developing countries like
China commonly represents a great challenge. Many managers in China often decline to
participate in survey research because they tend to be suspicious about its motives and intended
purpose (Brouthers et al., 2005). Chinese managers often refuse to expose firms’ business
information to a third party, because divulging business information is considered to be a
dangerous practice (Brouthers, et al., 2005). Thus, researchers often make questionnaires shorter
to facilitate survey completion (Brouthers and Xu, 2002). Such shorter questionnaires can result
in variables being measure by a single item. Thus it is not unusual for surveys in developing
countries like China to include single-item measures.
Third, this research requires asking about strategic motivations and entry mode choice of
foreign investments. It is possible that the managers may not be familiar with these types of firm
decisions. Thus, in the survey used in this study, some managers might not have provided
knowledgeable responses.
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Lastly, firms with defensive market-seeking motives tend to select acquisitions rather
than Greenfield investments. This result contradicts my theory that firms with market-seeking
motives tend to choose Greenfield investments. One of explanations could be that firms’ entry
modes choices are interfered by location decisions. Future research may be benefit to integrate
both together. In addition, as the first essay, defensive market-seeking investment and aggressive
market-seeking investment are different, future studies should keep this difference in mind when
examining overseas investment of MNEs.
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ESSAY #3
IMPACT OF THREE OWNERSHIP TYPES ON THE INTERNATIONAL
PERFORMANCE OF CHINESE FIRMS

INTRODUCTION
As China transitions from a centrally planned to a market-driven economy (Xu, Pan, Wu
and Yim, 2006) different types of Chinese firm ownership structures emerge to compete in
domestic and international markets (Jefferson and Rawski, 2000; Peng, 2003; Tan, 2002).
Recently the strategic management literature has begun to examine transitional economies;
These differences in ownership have become an increasingly important issue, generating a
growing literature which examines the impacts of different types of ownership from strategic and
organizational perspectives (Hoskisson, Lorraine, Lau & Wright, 2000; Peng, 2004; Peng et al.,
2004; Tan, 2002; Peng and Luo, 2000; Xu et al., 2006; Li and Zhang, 2007). In this study, we
explore the potential influence of various ownership types on Chinese MNEs’ international
performance by assessing differences in government ties and corporate entrepreneurship among
varying types of Chinese MNEs.
Ownership patterns are quite different in transitional economies than in developed
countries (Tan, 2002). For instance, China is characterized by three ownership types, the stateowned enterprise (SOE), the collective-owned enterprise (COE) and the privately-owned
enterprise (POE) (Tan, 2002; Peng et al., 2004, Xu et al., 2006; Shenkar and Von Glinow, 1994;
Nee, 1992; Li, 1996).
Of the three ownership types, SOEs and POEs are common to other transitional or
emerging economies, such as Hungary (Steensma, Tihanyi, Lyles, & Dhanaraj, 2005), Eastern
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Europe (Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997), Chile and Poland (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Stateowned enterprises (SOEs) are owned by the central government or state agencies. SOEs bear a
large bureaucratic burden; traditionally they have been utilized by governments to maximize
employment and social wealth (Lin, Qian, Lam and Wang, 2000). This commonly results in low
efficiency and profits (Xu et al., 2006).
In China, most POEs are family owned, making them distinctive from SOEs (Peng et al.,
2004). POEs are typically newer and smaller (Peng, et al., 2004) and restricted to specific
industries (Tan, 2002; Boisot and Child, 1996). POEs have no formal ties to the government, but
retain a large degree of autonomy (Tan, 2002). In China POEs typically function as the
entrepreneurial sector, being flexible, identifying new opportunities, responding quickly to
environment changes, and attempting to achieve high performance targets (Tan, 2002; Peng et
al., 2004).
The collective-owned enterprise (COE) represents a hybrid form of ownership,
incorporating elements of both the SOE and the POE (Nee, 1992; Boisot and Child, 1996). Like
the SOE, a COE has an element government-ownership; as such they are subordinate to local
governments, but owned and operated by the workers or private cooperative organizations (Tan,
2002). Specifically, individual “entrepreneurs can bid for long-term leases to control…” COEs
(Peng et al., 2004). Like an SOE a COE typically receives support and/or protection from a
local government, but like a POE a COE still maintains a high degree of managerial autonomy
(Peng et al. 2004). Thus, collective-owned enterprises (COEs) represent a unique type of Chinese
ownership falling between the POE and the SOE.
In this paper using both corporate entrepreneurial and resource based views, we suggest
that international success appears to depend on two factors: (1) social network ties with the
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government or state agencies (Yiu et al., 2007); and (2) corporate entrepreneurial orientation
(Ireland, Hitt, Camp and Sexton, 2001; Dess, Ireland, Zahra, Floyd, Janney and Lane, 2003).
More specifically, in order to internationalize successfully, Chinese firms must find ways to
obtain material support from the state, while maintaining a sufficient degree of corporate
entrepreneurship freedom (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Since the COE combines both factors we
propose that the Chinese COE will typically have better international performance than either
Chinese POEs or SOEs.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Previous studies found that ownership appears to exert a direct influence on firm
performance (Von Nordenflycht, 2007; Xu et al., 2006; Daily, Dalton and Rajagopalan, 2003;
Tam and Tan, 2007). However, early research examining the ownership-performance link has
largely focused on ownership concentration and firm performance from an agency theory
perspective (Daily et al., 2003). Few studies explore the influence of various ownership types on
firm performance (e.g. Xu et al., 2006); none of these studies explore the link between ownership
type and international performance.
Typically, ownership type is considered to be a strategic variable (Gedajlovic, 1993)
which has an influence on firm strategy formulation and performance. For emerging/transitional
economy firms various types of ownership often have different governance structures,
organizational culture sand resources, resulting in different strategies and performances. Here we
examine type of ownership’s (SOE, COE and POE) influence on the international performance
of Chinese firms examining the roles of government ties and corporate entrepreneurship.
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Ownership Types
State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
In China SOEs are controlled by the central government or state agencies (Peng et al.,
2004; Tan, 2002). A large portion of purchasing, production, and market activities is controlled
by the government (Perkins, 1994). Senior level managers in Chinese SOEs are typically
appointed by the government (Li and Zhang, 2007). As a result of Government and Communist
Party involvement, Chinese SOEs receive support or even protection from the government or
state agencies (Peng et al., 2004). Most Chinese SOEs rely on the state to be their primary
banker, supplier, and distributor (Steinfeld, 1998; Child, 1994; Lu, 1996; Tan and Peng, 2003).
Typically, managers of Chinese SOEs are less innovative and take fewer risks than POE
managers (Tan, 2002; De Mente, 1989). This is because in SOEs, state agencies control the
firms’ purchasing, production and marketing activities (Perkins, 1994). Moreover, in specific
industries (e.g., petroleum, chemicals, power, iron and steel), the state, rather than the
marketplace, sets prices. Thus, managers of Chinese SOEs particularly in these industries, pay
little attention to competitive issues since there is no need to do so (Peng et al., 2004). Because
of this, they lack the experience associated with making proactive and risk-taking decisions when
faced with uncertain environments (Tan, 2002).
Private-owned enterprises (POEs)
Relative to SOEs, POEs “represent the opposite being usually small but nimble, poor in
R&D but good at market orientation” (Peng et al., 2004: p1111). Most Chinese POEs are family
owned; this clearly differentiates them from SOEs (Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang &
Egri, 2006; Tan, 2002). POEs typically receive little support from the government or state
agencies. For instance State-owned Chinese banks commonly offer preferential loan treatment to
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the SOE and COE but not to the POE (Tan, 2002); the typical POE operates under hard budget
constraints and has to be self-reliant (Peng et al, 2004). As a result, the POE remains small and
undercapitalized. Thus, a Chinese POE’s access to critical resources including raw materials,
marketing channels, capital and human resources is limited because they rank last with respect to
governmental priorities.
However, the owners or managers of Chinese POEs tend to be entrepreneurs or families
(Tan, 2002). In general, entrepreneurs commonly seek to identify new opportunities, are very
flexible, rapidly respond to environment changes, and take appropriate actions to achieve
performance (Tan, 1996). Their flexibility and small size enable them to react quickly to new
opportunities in the environment. Moreover, owner-operated entrepreneurial firm tend to have
fewer principal-agent conflicts and greater strategic flexibility (Tan, 1996; 2001). Thus, A POE
typically operates more efficiently than an SOE, making quicker decisions, and less constrained
by government.
Collectively-owned enterprises (COEs)
Collectively-owned firms are subordinate to local governments, but owned and operated
by a collective group, either the workers or private cooperative organizations (Tan, 2002). Nee
(1992) suggests, like hybrids in developed economies, COEs display organizational attributes
that fall somewhere between SOEs and POEs. Because COEs often constitute a primary source
of revenues for local governments, COEs receive enormous aid from local governments; such aid
may include financing, access to resources, and raw materials as well as working capital (Tan,
2002; Peng et al., 2004; Boisot and Child, 1996). Thus, a COE maintains a close relationship
with a local government and in turn gains greater institutional support than a POE.
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In addition, because resources at the local level are usually less abundant than at the
central level (Peng, 2004), COEs exerts much less influence on senior management.
Finally, a COE is more market-oriented than a SOE, because a COE operates outside of the
Central government’s economic plan (Peng et al., 2004). The combination of all these factors
this allow a COE to have more managerial autonomy than an SOE. Thus, the dual influences of
the state and the private sector are embedded in COEs.
Government Ties and International Performance
From a resource-based perspective, success in international venturing is largely
determined by resources and capabilities that firms possess (Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney and
Manrakhan, 2007). These resources could be physical capital resources, human capital resources
and organizational capital resources (Barney, 1991). Firms with valuable, rare, imperfectly
imitable and non-substitutable resources can develop sustainable competitive advantage and
generate supernormal returns (Olive, 1997; Barney, 1991, 1992). However, resources are
context-based and firms have to manage the institutional context of their resource decisions
(Olive, 1997; Hoskisson et al., 2000). Thus, firms with the ability to develop or create
institutional capital often acquire/create greater firm resources (Hoskisson et al, 2000). Thus,
both resource capital and institutional capital are indispensable to create and sustain competitive
advantage (Olive, 1997).
Specifically, in emerging economies, the lack of an adequate legal frameworks and stable
political structures result in the underdevelopment of strategic factors markets, which leads to
difficulties in creating the competitive advantages necessary for international expansion (Yiu, et
al., 2007). Thus, maintaining a good relationship with state governments helps firms to access
resources (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In a transitional economy, having close connections with the
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governmental social network represents one type of key strategic asset or resource (Luo and
Tung, 2007; Buckley et al, 2007).
For instance, in China, firms have to seek for government approval when they plan to
establish foreign ventures. Thus, institutional links are especially critical in China, where central
and local governments remain heavily involved in directing outward FDI. Access to such
networks provides opportunities for mutual support and reciprocal favors between firms and
government (Child and Yuan, 1996), helping firms to build long-term competitive advantages. In
addition, by having the state as a partial owner, firms may more easily gain the state’s
sponsorship or bank loans to fund overseas investment (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). It also
becomes easier for firms to create official network ties with the government (Peng & Luo, 2000).
Corporate Entrepreneurship and Internationalization
A second way for Chinese firms to develop strategic assets/resources is to engage in
corporate entrepreneurial activities; by doing so they can accumulate intangible resources like:
venturing capabilities, knowledge, and experience. These intangible resources, according to Yiu
et al. (2007), can provide a basis for successful international venturing.
Entrepreneurial actions are a “fundamental behavior of firms by which they move into
new markets, seize new customers and/or combine (existing) resources in new ways.” (Ireland et
al, 2001). Entrepreneurial and strategic actions are often intended to find new markets or
competitive spaces in which firms create wealth (Ireland, et al., 2001). Zahra and Garvis (2000)
theorized and empirically found that corporate entrepreneurship moderates the relationship
between a firm’s internationalization and its financial performance. Specially, their findings
show that companies with higher levels of corporate entrepreneurship were able to achieve

41

higher performance through international expansion than those firms with lower corporate
entrepreneurship scores.
Managerial autonomy is considered as one of the key components of corporate
entrepreneurship (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Autonomy refers to the independent actions of
managers in bringing forth new ideas or visions and carrying them through the strategy-making
process. In China, SOEs enjoy government support for internationalization at the expense of
strategic autonomy. SOEs remain beholden to administrative approval and bear a legacy of
institutional dependency. This legacy can inhibit strategic action either through promoting a
conservative attitude or through direct constraints (Child and Rodrigues, 2005).

HYPOTHESES
Of the three types of Chinese organizations, SOEs have the most direct ties with the
central government. For this reason they are abundant with resources provided by the state or
state agencies. However, because an SOE is fully owned by the state it functions more like a
government agency than a private business (Tan, 2002). SOE managers tend to have less
managerial autonomy than managers of other ownership types due to external rules, such as
rigid, hierarchical reporting requirements to government controllers (Boisot and Child, 1996). As
a result, (1) state enterprises exhibit low operating efficiency and (2) SOE managers tend to be
more plutocratic and less entrepreneurial (Tan, 2002).
The owner of a POE is typically an entrepreneur who seeks to identify new opportunities,
respond to environment changes, and take appropriate actions to achieve performance (Tan,
2002). The typical Chinese POE receives little support and/or resources from the government
(Peng et al., 2004). Although the typical Chinese POE is entrepreneurial, quickly responding to
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market changes, identifying new opportunities, its’ scope of activity is restricted by its limited
resources (cites). Because international expansion commonly requires extensive resources,
Chinese POE opportunities are limited.
The COE is a hybrid, combining traits of the POE and the SOE (Nee, 1992). The typical
COE has a close relationship with local governments, resulting in more institutional support for a
COE compared to a POE while also being more responsive to the market than an SOE (Peng et
al., 2004). This dual orientation results in two benefits. First, a COE gains assistance from the
local government which helps (1) to create a more favorable task environment and (2) to bring
more resources (such as financial capital, working capital etc.) to the COE. Second, COE
managers are less restricted by central governmental policies than an SOE. This allows them to
be entrepreneurial and market-oriented. Such advantages increase operational flexibility and
organizational capability. We propose that both of these factors create firm specific advantages
when engaging in international investment. Thus, based on the above discussion we hypothesize
that COE firms, because they have both government social network resource advantages and
intangible corporate entrepreneurial resource-based advantages will, on average, have better
returns on international investment than the typical Chinese POE or SOE.
H6: A typical Chinese COE has better returns on international investment than the
typical Chinese POE or SOE.

METHODOLOGY
Sample and data source
In 2006, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and the China Council for Promotion of
International Trade jointly conducted a survey, exploring the overseas investment of Chinese
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companies. The data used in the current research comes from this study. The China Goes Global
(2006) dataset. The survey collected 164 valid responses used in this analysis.
Dependent variable
International performance
International performance was defined by two measures, subjective performance and
objective performance. Based on the previous scholarship (Bird and Beechler, 1995; Brouthers
and Xu, 2002), the subjective international performance is measured as the manager’s overall
satisfaction with international activities. Managers were asked to rate the satisfaction levels on a
four-point scale, ranging from “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied). The objective international
performance is measured as total overseas revenue divided by total overseas investments, an
international aspect of revenue on investment. The ratio of revenues by investment has been
used in the previous studies to measure firms’ overall performance (Anderson and Zeithaml,
1984; Bruton, Oviatt and White, 1994), but this measurement mixes up both domestic
performance and international performance. Unlike previous research, international performance
is measured as total overseas revenues divided by total overseas investments extracted from
firms’ overall performance, ROI. As in previous studies (Osland and Cavusgil, 1996; Brouthers
and Xu, 2002), Chinese managers were unwilling to give actual data on firms’ profitability, but
were willing to answer questions on certain scales. Thus, in the current research, total overseas
revenues divided by total overseas investments is calculated as,
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Independent variables
Ownership types
Ownership types include state-owned enterprise (SOE), collectively-owned (COE) and
publicly-owned enterprises and privately-owned enterprise (POE) (Tan, 2002 & 2007; Peng et
al., 2004). Ownership is coded “1” when a firm is a SOE, “2” when it is a COE or a publiclyowned enterprise and “3” when it is a POE.
Control variables
Three control variables are included in this study: international experience, firm size and
industry classification. MNEs with extensive international experience perform better than firms
with less experience (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Following Brouthers et al. (1999) and
Henisz & Macher (2004), international experience is measured as the number of years
experience in investing outside the home country. Firm size is measured on a five-point ordinal
scale, based on the level of annual gross revenue in 2005 (1= under RMB 1 million, 2=RMB 1-9
million, 3=RMB 10-49 million, 4=50-100 million and 5=Over RMB 100 million). In addition, I
also control for possible industry effects on firms’ international performance (Brouthers and
Brouthers, 2000), I coded 1 for manufacturing firms and 0 for service firms.

RESULTS
Table 3-1 presents a correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for all variables used in
the study.
-------------------------------Insert Table 3-1 here
--------------------------------
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Table 3-2 shows the results of mean comparison analyses used to test the subjective
performance differences. The results show that collectively-owned/publicly-owned enterprises
(3.17) have better subjective performance than state-owned enterprises (3.00) or privately-owned
enterprises (3.13), consisting with hypotheses. However, due to small sample size, a linear
regression analysis is not further conducted to test subjective performance.
-------------------------------Insert Table 3-2 here
-------------------------------Table 3-3 shows the results of ordinal linear regressions (OLS) used to test the objective
performance differences. Model 1a and Model 1b show the results when comparing COEs and
SOEs. Model 1a only includes three control variables, international experience, firm size and
manufacturing. Model 1b adds the independent variable, ownership on Model 1a. Model 1b
shows that overall model is statistically significant (R-square=0.39, p< 0.01). The independent
variable, ownership has a significantly positive impact on the objective performance. In the
current analysis, COE is coded as “2” while SOE is coded as “1”; this result shows that COEs
have better performance than SOEs, supporting H6.

-------------------------------Insert Table 3-3 here
-------------------------------Model 2a and Model 2b show the results when comparing COEs and POEs. Model 2a
only includes three control variables, international experience, firm size and manufacturing.
Model 2b adds the independent variable, ownership on Model 2a. Model 2b shows that overall
model is statistically significant (R-square=0.46, p< 0.01). The independent variable, ownership
has a significantly negative impact on the objective performance. In the current analysis, COE is
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coded as “2” while POE is coded as “3”; this result shows that COEs have better performance
than POEs, supporting H6.

CONCLUSION
The current study has a few limitations. First, multinational firms often proceed gradually
in overseas investments (Buckley, Cross, Tan, Xin, and Voss, 2008). Particularly, emerging
market firms often first enter markets that are culturally, physically, and economically similar to
their home countries (Buckley et al., 2008; Tsang and Yip, 2007). Then as the firm’s
international experience grows and the firm becomes more competitive in foreign markets, it
starts to enter more psychically distant countries. Thus performance expectations vary at
different stages. In order to test the current theory, time series data might be required. Second,
the current project focuses on exploring the international performance of three types of firms,
POEs, COEs and SOEs. Other type firms or other ways of classifying Chinese MNEs’ ownership
may exist (Delios, Zhou, & Xu, 2009). Future research may wish to extend this research project
to other ownership types of firms.
The primary contribution of this research comes from examining the impact of ownership
on the international performance of Chinese firms. By assessing differences in government ties
and corporate entrepreneurship among varying types of Chinese MNEs, I propose and that COEs
have both government social network resource advantages and intangible corporate
entrepreneurial-based strategic assets, on average, will outperform both SOEs and POEs. The
results suggest that COEs have better international performance from both subjective and
objective views.
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The current research suggests that COEs gain financial or policy supports from local
governments while maintaining managerial autonomy. For those reasons, on average COEs have
better international performance than SOEs and POEs. Since COE is an unique type of firms in
transition economies, our model might be restrict in the certain nations. However, future
research might extend the current model to other nations by directly examining levels of
government supports and corporate entrepreneurship each firm has.

48

REFERENCES
Anand, J. & Delios, A. 2002. Absolute and relative resources as determinants of international
acquisition. Strategic Management Journal, 23(2): 119-134.
Anderson, C. R. & Zeithaml, C. P. 1984. Stage of the product life cycle, business strategy and
business performance. Academy of Management Journal, 27(1): 5-24.
Barkema, H. G. & Vermeulen, F. 1998. International expansion through start-up or acquisition:
A learning perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 41(1): 7-26.
Belderbos, R. 2003. Entry mode, organizational learning, and R&D in foreign affiliates:
Evidence from Japanese firms. Strategic Management Journal, 24(3): 235-259.
Boisot, M. & Child , J. 1996. From fiefs to clans and network capitalism: explaining China’s
emerging economic order. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(4): 600-628.
Bruton, G. D., Oviatt, B. M. & White, M. A. 1994. Performance of acquisitions of distressed
firms. Academy of Management Journal, 37(4): 972-989.
Brouthers, K. D. & Brouthers, L. E. 2000. Acquisitions or Greenfield start-up? Institutional,
cultural and transaction cost influences. Strategic Management Journal, 21(1): 89-97.
Brouthers, K. D. & Bamossy, G. J. 1997. The role of key stakeholders in international joint
negotiations: case studies from eastern Europe. Journal of International Business Studies,
28(2): 285-308.
Brouthers, L. E., Brouthers, K. D. & Werner, S. 1999. Is Dunning’s eclectic framework
descriptive or normative? Journal of International Business Studies, 30(4): 831-844.
Brouthers, L. E., Gao, Y. & McNicol, J. P. 2008. The impact of corruption and market
attractiveness on different types of FDI. Strategic Management Journal. 29(6): 673-680.
Brouthers, L. E., O’Donnell, E., & Hadjimarcou, J. 2007. Generic product strategies for
emerging market exports into triad nation markets: A mimetic isomorphism approach. Journal
of Management Studies. 42 (1): 225-245.
Buckley, P. J. & Casson, M. C. 1976. The future of the multinational enterprise. London:
Macmillan.
Buckley, P. J., Cross, A. R., Tan, H., Xin, L. & Voss, H. 2008. Historic and emergent trends in
Chinese outward direct investment. Management International Review, 48(6): 715-748.
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A. R., Liu, X., Voss, H & Zheng, P. 2007. The determinants
of Chinese outward foreign direct investment. Journal of International Business Studies,
38(4):499-518.
49

Buckley, P. J. & Ghauri, P. N. 1999. The internationalization of the firm. London: Thomson
Business Press.
Caves, R. E. 1971. International corporations: The industrial economics of foreign investment.
Economica, 38: 1-17.
Caves, R. E. 1982. Multinational Enterprises and Economic Analysis. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Child, J. & Rodrigues, S. B. 2005. The internationalization of Chinese firms: a case for
theoretical extension? Management and Organization Review, 1(3): 381-410.
Chang, S. J. 1995. International expansion strategy of Japanese firms: Capability building
through sequential entry. Academy of Management Journal, 38(2): 383-407.
Chang, S. J. & Rosenzweig, P. M. 2001. The choice of entry mode in sequential foreign direct
investment. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 747-776.
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R. & Rajagopalan. 2003. Governance through ownership: centuries of
practice, decades of research. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2): 151-158.
Delios, A., Zhou, N. & Xu, W. W. 2009. Ownership structure and the diversification and
performance of publicly-listed companies in China. Business Horizons, 51(6): 473-483.
Deng, P. 2004. Outward investment by Chinese MNCs: Motivations and implications. Business
Horizons, 47 (3): 8-16.
Deng, P. 2007. Investing for strategic resource and its rationale: The case of outward FDI from
Chinese companies. Business Horizons, 50:71-81.
Deng, P. 2009. Why do Chinese firms tend to acquire strategic assets in international expansion?
Journal of World Business, 44 (1): 74-84.
Dess, G. G., Ireland, R. D., Zahra, S. A., Floyd, S. W., Janney, J. J. & Lane, P. J. 2003.
Emerging issues in corporate entrepreneurship. Journal of Management Studies, 29(3): 351378.
Dunning, J. H. 1977. Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: A search for an
eclectic approach. In B. Ohlin, P.O. Hesselborn, & P.M. Wijkman (Eds.), The international
allocation of economic activity: 395-418. New York: Holmes & Meier.
Dunning, J. H. 1981. International production and multinational enterprise, Allen & Unwin:
London.

50

Dunning, J. H. 1993. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. New York: AddisonWesley.
Dunning, J. H. 1995. Reappraising the eclectic paradigm in an age of alliance capitalism.
Journal of International Business Studies, 26(3): 461-491.
Dunning, J. H. 1998. Location and the multinational enterprise: A neglected factor? Journal of
International Business Studies, 29(1): 45-66.
Gedajlovic, E. 1993. Ownership, strategy and performance: is the dichotomy sufficient?
Organization Studies, 14(5): 731-752.
Gimeno, J., Hoskisson, R. E., Beal, B. D. & Wan, W. P. 2005. Explaining the clustering of
international expansion moves: A critical test in the U.S. telecommunications industry. Academy
of Management Journal, 48(2):297-319.
Epple, D., Argote, L. & Devadas, R. 1991. Organizational learning curves: A method for
investigating intra-planet transfer of knowledge acquired through learning by doing.
Organization Science, 2 (1): 58-70.
Harzing, A. W. 2002. Acquisition versus greenfield investments: International strategy and
management of entry modes. Strategic Management Journal, 23(3): 211-227.
Hennart, J. F. 1982. A theory of multinational enterprise. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.
Hennart, J. F. & Park, Y. R. 1993. Greenfield vs. Acquisition: The strategy of Japanese investors
in the United States. Management Science, 39(9): 1054-1070.
Hennart, J. F. & Reddy, S. 1997. The choice between mergers/acquisition and joint ventures: The
case of Japanese investors in the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 18(1): 1-12.
Henisz, W. J. & Macher, J. T. 2004. Firm- and country-level trade-offs and contingencies in the
evaluation of foreign investment the semiconductor industry, 1994-2002. 15(5): 537-554.
Hoskisson, R. E. , Eden, L., Lau, C. M. &Wright, M. 2000. Strategy in emerging economies.
Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 249-267.
Hymer, S. 1976. The international operations of national firm: A study of direct foreign
investment. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M. A., Camp, S. M. & Sexton, D. L. 2001. Integrating entrepreneurship and
strategic management actions to create firm wealth. Academy of Management Executive, 15(1):
49-63

51

Jefferson, G. H. & Rawski, T. G. 2000. Ownership, productive change and financial performance
in Chinese industry. Journal of Comparative Economics, 28(4): 786-813.
Johanson, J. & Vahlne, J. E. 1977. The internationalization process of the firm: A model of
knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments, Journal of International
Business Studies, 8(1): 23-32.
Kindleberger, C. P. 1969. American business abroad: Six lectures on direct investment. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Kogut, B. & Singh, H. 1988. The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal
of International Business Studies, 19(3): 411-432.
Kumar, N. & McLeod, M. G. 1981. Multinationals from Developing Countries. Lexinglon,
MA: D.C. Health and Company.
Lall, S. 1983. The New Multinationals: The Spread of Third World Enterprises. New York:
Wiley.
Lecraw, D. 1977. Direct investment by firms from less developed countries. Oxford Economic
Papers. 29: 442-457.
Lecraw, D. 1993. Outward direct investment by Indonesian firms: Motivation and effects.
Journal of International Business Studies, 24(3): 589-600.
Li, D. D. 1996. A theory of ambiguous property rights in transition economies: The case of the
Chinese non-state sector. Journal of Comparative Economics, 23(1): 1-19.
Li, H.Y. & Zhang, Y. 2007. The role of managers’ political networking and functional
experience in new venture performance: evidence from China’s transition economy. Strategic
Management Journal, 28(8): 791-804.
Luo, Y & Tung, R. L. 2007 International expansion of emerging market enterprises: A spring
board perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4): 481-498.
Makino, S., Lau, C. M. & Yeh, R. H. 2002. Asset-exploitation versus asset-seeking: Implications
for location choice of foreign direct investment from newly industrialized economies. Journal of
International Business Studies, 33(3): 403-421.
March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization
Science. 2(1): 71-87.
Melin, L. 1992. Internationalization as a strategy process. Strategic Management Journal, 13:
99-118.

52

Moon, H. C. & Roehl, T. W. 2001 Unconventional foreign direct investment and the imbalance
theory. International Business Review 10(2): 197-215.

Nachum L, Zaheer S. 2005. The persistence of distance? The impact of technology on MNE
motivations for foreign investment. Strategic Management Journal 26(8): 747-767.

Narula, R & Dunning, J. H. 2000. Industrial development, globalization and multinational
enterprises: New realities for developing countries. Oxford Development Studies, 28(2):141167.
Nelson, R.R. & Winter, S.G. The Schumpeterian tradeoff revisited. American Economic
Review, 72(1): 114-132.
Nee, V. 1992. Organizational dynamics of market transition: hybrid forms, property rights and
mixed economy in China. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(1): 1-27.
Osland, G. E. & Cavusgil, S. T. 1996. Performance issues in U.S.-China joint ventures.
California Management Review, 38(2): 106-130.
Peng, M. W. 2003. Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of Management
Review, 28(2): 275-296.
Peng, M. W. 2004. Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions.
Strategic Management Journal, 25(5): 453-471.
Peng, M. W. & Luo, Y. 2000. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy:
The nature of a micro-macro link. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 486-501.
Peng, M. W., Justin, T. & Tong, T. W. 2004. Ownership types and strategic groups in an
emerging economy. Journal of Management Studies, 41(7): 1105-1129.
Phatak, A.V., Bhagat, R. S. & Kashlak, R. J. 2005. International Management: Managing in a
diverse and dynamic global environment. McGraw-Hill.
Randøy, T. & Clay, D. C. 2002. How and why Norwegian MNCs commit resources abroad:
Beyond choice of entry mode. Management International Review, 42(2): 119-140.
Ruiz-Moreno, F., Mas-Ruiz, F. J. & Nicolau-Gonzálbez, J. L. 2007. Two-stage choice process of
FDI: Ownership structure and diversification mode. Journal of Business Research, 60(7): 795805.
Sanchez-Peinado, E., Pla-barber, J.& Hebert., L. 2007. Journal of International Marketing.
15(1): 67-91.

53

Shan, W. & Hamilton, W. 1991. Country-specific advantage and international cooperation.
Strategic Management Journal, 12(6): 419-432.
Shenkar, O. & Von Glinow, M. A. 1994. Paradoxes of organizational theory and research: using
the case of China to illustrate national contingency. Management Science, 40(1): 56-71.
Slangen, A. & Hennart, J. 2008. Do multinationals really prefer to enter culturally distant
countries through Greenfields rather than through acquisitions? The role of parent experience
and subsidiary autonomy. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(3): 472-490.
Steensma, H. K., Tihanyi, L., Lyles, M. A. & Dhanaraj, C. 2005. The evolving value of foreign
partnerships in transitioning economies. Academy of Management Journal, 48(2): 213-235.
Tan, J. 2002. Impact of ownership type on environment-strategy linkage and performance:
evidence from a transitional economy. Journal of Management Studies, 39(3): 333-354.
Tam, O. K. & Tan, M. G. 2007. Ownership, governance and firm performance in Malaysia.
Corporate Governance: An international review. 15(2): 208-222.
Teece, D. J. 1987. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration,
collaboration, licensing, and public policy. The Competitive Challenge. Teece, DJ. (Ed).
Harper-Collings, Ballinger Division: New York.
Tsang, E. & Yip, P. 2007. Economic distance and the survival of foreign direct investments.
Academy of Management Journal, 50(5): 1156-1168.
Vernon, R. 1966. International investment and international trade in the product cycle. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, LXXX (May): 190-207.
Vickers, J. & Yarrow, G. 1991. Economic perspectives on privatization. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 5(2): 111-132.
Von nordenflyvht, A. 2007. Is public ownership bad for professional service firms? Ad agency
ownership, performance, and creativity. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2): 429-445.
Wells, L. T. 1977. The internationalization of firms from developing countries. In Tamir Agmon
and Charles P. Kindleberger, editors, Multinationals from Small Countries. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press: 133-156.
Wells, L. T 1983. Third World Multinationals: The Rise of Foreign Investment form
Developing Countries. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wesson, T. 1999. A model of asset-seeking foreign direct investment driven by demand
conditions. Canadian Journal of Administrative Science, 16: 1-10.

54

Xu, D., Pan, Y., Wu, C., & Yim, B. 2006. Performance of domestic and foreign-invested
enterprises in China. Journal of World Business, 41(3): 261-274.
Yiu, D. W., Lau C. M. & Bruton, G. D. 2007. International venturing by emerging economy
firms: the effects of firm capabilities, home country networks and corporate entrepreneurship.
Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4); 519-540.
Zaheer, S. 1995. Overcoming the liability of foreignness. Academy of Management Journal,
38(2): 341-363.

55

Figure 1 Tested Model
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Table 1-1
Correlation Matrix
Variable
1. Advanced Industrialized Countries (AICs)
2. Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs)
3. Developing Countries (DCs)
4. Seeking new markets (M1)
5. Avoiding saturated home markets (M2)
6. Avoiding trade barriers (M3)
7. Acquiring advanced technology (S1)
8. Obtaining internationally recognized brands (S2)
9. Learning advanced management methods (S3)
10. International experience
11. Firm size
12. Manufacturing
Variable
10. International experience
11. Firm size
12. Manufacturing

Mean
0.56
0.52
0.23
5.11
4.84
4.84
4.41
5.03
5.20
0.00
1.01
0.57
10
0.685 **
0.023

S.D.
0.50
0.50
0.42
1.61
1.74
1.67
1.75
1.49
1.38
0.80
1.29
0.50

1
-0.523 **
-0.140 †
0.397 **
0.348 **
0.271 **
0.352 **
0.134 †
0.161
0.091
0.190 *
-0.093

2

-0.070
-0.193 *
-0.069
0.115
-0.159 *
0.069
0.046
0.038
0.009
0.116

11

0.037

† p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01 (two-tailed t-test)

58

3

0.136
0.169
-0.063
0.081
-0.060
-0.045
-0.130
-0.142
0.171

4

†
*

†
†
*

0.493 **
0.230 **
0.556 **
0.139 †
0.106
0.037
0.118
-0.079

5

0.306 **
0.353 **
0.082
0.235 **
-0.069
0.102
-0.053

6

0.269 **
0.245 **
0.357 **
0.049
0.224 **
-0.023

7

0.274 **
0.355 **
-0.139 †
0.066
-0.099

8

0.441 **
-0.051
-0.096
0.093

9

-0.128
-0.025
-0.057

Table 1-2
Results of OLS Analyses
AICs
Variables

DCs

NICs

Model 1a
B

Model 1b
B

Model 2a
B

Model 2b
B

Model 3a
B

Model 3b
B

Control
International experience
Firm size

-0.001
0.045

-0.011
0.048

0.007
-0.049 *

0.006
-0.038

-0.006
0.003

0.005
-0.010

Manufacturing

-0.136

-0.108

0.059

0.006

0.077

0.039

†

Independent
Seeking new markets (M1)

0.048 *

Avoiding saturated home markets (M2)

0.005

0.023

Avoiding trade barriers (M3)
Acquiring advanced technology (S1)
Obtaining internationally recognized brands (S2)
Learning advanced management methods (S3)

0.021

0.022
0.045 *
-0.004
-0.022

-0.053 *
†

-0.031

†
†

-0.051 ***
0.013
-0.016
0.002

0.029
-0.058 *
0.020
0.021

Intercept

0.510 ***

0.059

0.120 **

0.240 *

0.370 ***

0.701 ***

n
R-square
Adjusted R-square
one-tailed test for hypothesized variables.
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01

166
0.035
0.017

166
0.141 **
0.091 **

166
0.035
0.017

166
0.134 **
0.084 **

166
0.010
n.a

166
0.173 ***
0.125 ***
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Table 1-3
Results of Binary Logistic Regression Analyses

Variables
Control
International experience
Firm size
Manufacturing

AICs
Model 1a
Model 1b
B
Odds
B
Odds
Ratio
Ratio
-0.201
0.818
0.190
1.210
0.415 *
1.515
0.204
1.227
-0.419
0.658
-0.323
0.724

Independent
Seeking new markets (M1)
Avoiding saturated home markets (M2)
Avoiding trade barriers (M3)
Acquiring advanced technology (S1)
Obtaining internationally recognized brands (S2)
Learning advanced management methods (S3)
Intercept
n
-2Log-likelihood
Chi-square
Nagelkerke R-square
one-tailed test for hypothesized variables.
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01

0.289 *
0.236 *
0.149
0.220 *
0.092
0.943

1.335
1.267
1.160
1.246
1.097
1.011

0.084

-4.529 **

0.011

164
216.544
8.363 *
0.067 *

164
180.112
44.795 **
0.320 **

NICs
DCs
Model 2a
Model 2b
Model 3a
Model 3
B
Odds
B
Odds B
Odds
B
Odds
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
0.152
1.164
0.145
1.156
-0.203
0.817
0.046
1.047
-0.057
0.944
-0.065
0.937
-0.223
0.800
-0.390
0.677
0.473
1.604
0.404
1.498
0.920 *
2.508
1.125 ** 3.081

-0.114
164
224.427
2.535
0.020
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0.892

-0.240 *
0.003
0.225 *
-0.165
0.104
0.050

0.787
1.003
1.252
0.848
1.110
1.052

0.017

1.018

164
211.448
15.513 †
0.120 †

-1.632 **
164
165.950
9.174 *
0.083 *

0.196

0.137
0.278 *
-0.104
0.131
-0.202
-0.079

1.147
1.321
0.901
1.14
0.817
0.924

-2.403 *

0.090

164
154.350
20.775 *
0.181 *

Variables

Table 2-2
Results of Binary Logistic Regression Analyses
Greenfield Vs. Acqusition
Model 1a
Model 1b
B
B

Control
International experience
Firm size
Manufacturing

0.02
-0.51 **
1.07 *

0.06
-0.62 *
0.96

Independent
Seeking new markets (M1)
Avoiding saturated home markets (M2)
Avoiding trade barriers (M3)
Acquiring advanced technology (S1)
Obtaining internationally recognized brands (S2)
Learning advanced management methods (S3)
Intercept
n
-2Log-likelihood
Chi-square
Nagelkerke R-square

0.44 *
-0.40 *
-0.25 †
-0.420 †
0.84 **
-0.64 **
2.00 **

4.49 **

107
109.92
8.75 *
0.12 *

107
79.30
39.37 **
0.46 **

one-tailed test for hypothesized variables.
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
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Table 3-1
Correlation Matrix
Variable
1. Objective performance
2. Subjective performance
3. Ownership types
4. International experience
5. Firm size
6. Manufacturing

Mean
5.18
3.10
2.31
2.66
3.10
0.71

S.D.
3.95
0.46
0.83
3.90
1.38
0.46

1
0.06
-0.09
-0.25 **
0.49 **
0.13 *

† p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01 (two-tailed t-test)
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2

0.11
0.08
0.06
-0.19

3

4

5

-0.25 **
-0.33 **
-0.13 *

0.23 **
-0.03

0.25 **

Table 3-2
Subjective performance
State-owned enterprises
Collectively-owned or Publicly-owned enterprises
Privately-owned enterprises

Mean Std. Deviation
3.00
0.55
3.17
0.38
3.13
0.40
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N
27
18
40

Table 3-3
Results of OLS on Objective Performance

Variables
Control
International experience
Firm size
Manufacturing

COEs vs. SOEs
Model 1a
Model 1b
B
B
-0.41 **
1.56 **
-0.26

Independent
Ownership
Intercept

R-square
Adjusted R-square
F value
n

-0.36 **
1.65 **
-0.11

COEs vs. POEs
Model 2a
Model 2b
B
B
-0.54 **
1.87 **
-0.01

-0.54 **
1.75 **
-0.10

2.19 **
2.01 †

0.33 **
0.30 **
15.28 **
98

-1.70 **

-1.85

-0.54 **

5.98 **

0.39 **
0.36 **
14.87 **
98

0.43 **
0.42 **
39.79 **
165

0.46 **
0.44 **
33.72 **
165

† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
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